Georgia State University College of Law

Reading Room
Georgia Business Court Opinions

3-20-2019

ROBERT 0 . SCARBOROUGH, JR et al.,
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO
COUNTS IV, VI, VII OF THE FOURTH
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Elizabeth E. Long
Fulton County Superior Court, Judge

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations
Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons
Institutional Repository Citation
Long, Elizabeth E., "ROBERT 0 . SCARBOROUGH, JR et al., ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS AS TO COUNTS IV, VI, VII OF THE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT" (2019). Georgia Business Court
Opinions. 467.
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt/467

This Court Order is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Business Court Opinions
by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

···- · ··-

- IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA
ROBERT 0. SCARBOROUGH, JR. and
JOHN R. HAMPARIAN,
Plaintiffs,
V.

)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action
File No. 2017CV290622

)

)

ANTHONY LArR and
AARON INGRAM,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS
TO COUNTS IV, VI, VII OF THE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
The above-styled case is before this Court on Defendants Joseph Delgado and Baker,
Done.Ison, Bearman, Caldwell, and Berkowitz, P.C.'s (collectively the "Baker Donelson
Defendants") Amended Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Counts IV, VI, and VII of
Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint. 1
Having considered the pleadings, the Court finds as follows:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs Robert D. Scarborough, Jr. and John R. Hamparian are minority shareholders in
NeoMed, Inc. ("NeoMed"), a company that provides neonatal focused devices.

Defendant

Anthony Lair is a director, majority shareholder, and the Chief Executive Officer of NeoMed.
Defendant Aaron Ingram is its President. Defendant Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz, P.C. ("Baker Donelson") has served as NeoMed's legal counsel since its formation in

The Baker Donelson Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Surreply to Their Amended Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings. Since the Court has not relied on Plaintiffs' surreply and Plaintiffs do not object to the
Motion to Strike, the Baker Donelson Defendants' Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

2007. Defendant Joseph Delgado is an attorney at Baker Donelson who has advised NeoMed on
corporate and transactional issues. He was involved in the transaction central to this litigation.
In the Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a claim for fraud against the Baker

Donelson Defendants arising out of Defendant Delgado's alleged actions and omissions with
respect to NeoMed's acquisition of NM Fulfillment, a company co-owned by Defendant Lair
("NM Fulfillment Acquisition"). Plaintiffs assert Defendants misrepresented, omitted, and/or
suppressed materials facts regarding the NM Fulfillment Acquisition, including NM
Fulfillment's valuation, the dilutive effect of the proposed acquisition on Plaintiffs' shares, and
the nature of the association of NM Fulfillment with Defendant Lair's company, Specialty
Medical Products ("SMP").2 Additionally, Plaintiffs aJlege the Baker Donelson Defendants
acted in concert with the other Defendants to defraud Plaintiffs of a portion of their interest in
NeoMed3 and aided and abetted the other Defendants in breaching their fiduciary duty towards
Plaintiffs.4
The Baker Donelson Defendants here seek judgment based on the pleadings on Count IV
(fraud), Count VI (conspiracy) and Count VII (aiding and abetting the other Defendants' illegal
action).
I.

Applicable Standard
"After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party

may move for judgment on the pleadings." O.C.G.A. § 9-1 l-12(c). The Georgia Court of Appeals
has noted that:
[W]hen deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the issue is
whether the undisputed facts appearing from the pleadings entitle the
movant to judgment as a matter of law.... Thus, the question before us is
2
3
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Fourth Amended Complaint, 1~ 118, I 20, 121.
Fourth Amended Complaint, 1~149, 152.
Fourth Amended Complaint, ~~ 124, 156.
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whether the undisputed facts appearing from tbe pleadings indicate that
[defendants are] entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Where the part[ies]
moving for judgment on the pleadings [do] not introduce affidavits,
depositions, or interrogatories in support of [their] motion, such motion is
the equivalent of a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion to dismiss should not be
granted unless the averments in the complaint disclose with certainty that
the plaintiff] s] would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which
could
be
proved
m
support
of
[their]
claim.
Sw. HeaJth & Wellness, L.L.C. v. Work, 282 Ga. App. 619, 623, 639 S.E.2d 570, 575 (2006)
(internaJ citations omitted). For purposes of the Motion, "[a]ll well-pleaded material allegations
by the nonmovant are taken as true, and all denials by the movant are taken as false. But the trial
court need not adopt a party's legal conclusions based on these facts." Id. (citation omitted).
"Further, in considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a triaJ court may consider
exhibits attached to and incorporated into the pleadings, including exhibits attached to the
complaint or the answer." Id.

II.

Analysis and Findings of Law
a.

Count JV - Fraud

In the Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs contend Defendant Delgado was present at
the October shareholders' meeting when Defendant Lair represented that the NM Fulfillment
Acquisition would result in a 5% dilution of Plaintiff Scarborough's shares when in fact it
diluted his shares by approximately 50%.

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the Baker Donelson

Defendants were "aware of [Defendant] Lair's motivation to dilute [PlaintiffJ Scarborough's
NeoMed shares'" but Defendant Delgado "knowingly made no attempt to correct or amend this
material representation at any time during the October [m]eeting or since.:"

The Fourth

Amended Complaint also alleges that Defendants made material misrepresentations of fact and

5
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Fourth Amended Complaint, ~I 15.
Fourth Amended Complaint', ~I 19.
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omitted material facts "with the intent to induce Plaintiffs to approve the NM Fulfillment
transaction.?" Plaintiffs allege that the Baker Donelson Defendants represented that the "[NM]

Fulfillment was a 'pass through' company" when in reality it was formerly a "doing business as"
entity for Defendant Lair's separate company, SMP.8

Finally, Plaintiffs allege the Baker

Donelson Defendants misrepresented that time was of the essence in approving the NM
Fulfillment Acquisition and that shareholder action was required immediately.
In their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the Baker Donelson Defendants assert
that Plaintiff Scarborough knew that his ownership interest would be diminished and thus he
cannot show justifiable reliance on any misrepresentations or omissions by Defendant Delgado.
Specifically, the Baker Donelson Defendants argue that Scarborough has failed to demonstrate
that he exercised due diligence to verify the dilutive effect the NM Fulfilment transaction would
have on his shares.
"[T]o prove fraud, the plaintiff must establish five elements: ( 1) a false representation by
a defendant, (2) scienter, (3) intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting, (4)
justifiable reliance by plaintiff, and (5) damage to plaintiff." Engelman v. Kessler, 340 Ga. App.
239, 246, 797 S.E.2d 160, 166 (2017), cert. denied (Aug. 14, 2017). See also O.C.G.A. §9-119(b) ("In all averrnents of fraud or mistake, the circumstance constituting fraud or mistake shall
be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person
may be averred generally"). "Whether a plaintiff could have protected itself by the exercise of
due diligence is generally a question for the jury; however, 'an exception occurs when a plaintiff
cannot offer evidence that he exercised his duty of due diligence to ascertain the truth and to

7
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Fourth Amended Complaint, ~ 124, 152.
Fourth Amended Complaint, ~120.
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avoid damage."' Liberty Capital. LLC, 338 Ga. App. at 54 ( citing Walden v. Smith, 249 Ga.
App. 32, 35, 546 S.E.2d 808 (2001)).
This Court considered the Baker Donelson Defendants' argument of lack of justifiable
reliance in its Order on a previous Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Earlier, the Baker
Donelson Defendants asserted that Plaintiff Scarborough cannot show justifiable reliance on
Defendant Delgado's representations because Plaintiff Scarborough hired his own counsel before
voting on the acquisition and that Defendant Delgado knew that he was represented by counsel.
In the present Motion, the Baker Donelson Defendants now add that Plaintiff Scarborough
cannot show justifiable reliance because he himself knew or should have known that his shares
would be diluted and that his ownership interest would be diminished.
The Court still finds, as in the earlier Order, that "[ujltimately Plaintiff Scarborough's
diligence to ascertain the truth and to avoid damage (e.g., by seeking outside counsel, requesting

financial and other information regarding the companies and the proposed transaction, the timing
of such requests, etc.) and his reliance on the information provided by Defendants are questions
which cannot be assessed and determined as a matter of law based solely on the pleadings.
Taking Plaintiffs' allegations in the [Fourth Amended Complaint] as true, the Court cannot find
as a matter of law that they 'disclose with certainty' that no set of facts consistent with the
allegations could be proved that would entitle [Plaintiffs] to the relief [they] seekQ."9
The Baker Donelson Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Plaintiff
Scarborough's Fraud claim is hereby DENIED.
b. Count VI - Conspiracy
In Count VI of the Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants acted in
concert to defraud Plaintiffs with the goal of fraudulently "diluting [Plaintiff] Scarborough's
9

Order, pp. 7-9.
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shares through NeoMed's acquisition of NM Fulfillment."10

Plaintiffs further allege that

Defendants conspired to get Plaintiff Scarborough's approval of the transaction.

11

Georgia law provides that a conspiracy upon which a civil action for
damages may be founded is a combination between two or more persons
either to do some act which is a tort, or else to do some lawful act by
methods which constitute a tort. Where it is sought to impose civil liability
for a conspiracy, the conspiracy of itself furnishes no cause of action. The
gist of the action, if a cause of action exists, is not the conspiracy alleged,
but the tort committed against the plaintiff and the resulting damage. Where
the act of conspiring is itself legal, the means or method of its
accomplishment must be illegal.
Rorzers v. Dupree, 340 Ga. App. 811,817, 799 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2017). Moreover, "[tjhe essential
element of the alleged conspiracy is proof of a common design." Rogers, 340 Ga. App. at 837.
"And anyone, after a conspiracy is formed, who knows of its existence and purposes and joins
therein, becomes as much a party thereto as if he had been an original member." Savannah
College of Art & Design v. School of Visual Arts of Savannah, 219 Ga. App. 296, 297, 464
S.E.2d 895 (1995).

In the earlier Order, this Court held that "since Plaintiff Hamparian abstained from
voting, the Court cannot say that he relied on Defendant Delgado's representations or
omissions.v'f Because the underlying tort is based on the allegations that Plaintiffs relied on
Defendant Delgado's misrepresentations in voting in favor of the acquisition, the conspiracy
claim fails as to Plaintiff Hamparian.
As to Plaintiff Scarborough, since the underlying fraud claim survives and taking his
allegations as true, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that the allegations "'disclose with
certainty' that no set of facts consistent with the allegations could be proven that would entitle
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Fourth Amended Complaint, ~~146, 149.
Fourth Amended Complaint, ~~149, 152.
Order, p.7.
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[Plaintiff Scarborough] to the relief [he] seeks." Bush v. Bank of New York Mellon, 313 Ga.
App. 84, 89, 720 S.E.2d 370, 374 (2011).
The Baker Donelson Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Plaintiffs'
Conspiracy claim is GRANTED as to Plaintiff Hamparian and DENIED as to Plaintiff
Scarborough.

c. Count Vll -Aiding and Abetting
In the Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Delgado assisted
Defendant Lair and Defendant Ingram in breaching their fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant Delgado, with knowledge of the fraudulent purpose of the transaction,
ftu.thered breaches of fiduciary duties by "failing to truthfully convey the nature of the NM
Fulfilment transaction and the effect the transaction would have on Plaintiffs' shares, and by
falsely stating that time was of the essence to complete the transaction .... "

13

The tort of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of the following
elements:
(1) through improper action or wrongful conduct and without privilege,
the defendant acted to procme a breach of the primary wrongdoer's
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; (2) with knowledge that the primary
wrongdoer owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty, the defendant acted
purposely and with malice and the intent to injure; (3) the defendant's
wrongful conduct procured a breach of the primary wrongdoer's fiduciary
duty; and (4) the defendant's tortious conduct proximately caused damage
to the plaintiff.
Kahn v. Britt, 330 Ga. App. 377, 389, 765 S.E.2d 446, 458 (2014) (emphasis in original). The
Khan case continues to state:
[t]he tort of aiding and abetting requires proof of virtually the same
elements as the tort of tortious interference with business relations. [I]n
order to be liable for tortious interference, one must be a stranger to both
the contract at issue and the business relationship giving rise to and
13

Fourth Amended Complaint, 1158.
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underpinning the contract. In other words, all parties to an interwoven
contractual arrangement are not liable for tortious interference with any of
the contracts or business relationships.
Khan, 330 Ga. App. at 389.
Most of the cases cited by the parties concern tortious interference rather than aiding and
abetting.

But the application of the stranger doctrine appears to apply equally to both. Am .

Mgmt. Servs. E .. LLC v. Forth Bennin g Fan1ilv Communities, LLC, 333 Ga. App. 664, 774
S.E.2d 233 (2015); Hyre v. Denise, 214 Ga. App. 552, 555, 449 S.E.2d 120, 125 (1994). To
establish that a defendant acted without privilege, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was
a stranger to the contract or business relationship at issue. Brathwaite v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp.
Auth., 317 Ga. App. 111, 113, 729 S.E.2d 625, 628 (2012) (citing to ASC Constr. Equip. USA.
Inc. v. City Comm ercial Real Estate, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 309, 313, 693 S.E.2d 559 (2010)).
"[O]nly a stranger to both the contract at issue and the business relationship giving rise to and
underpinning the contract may be liable for tortious interference." Brathwaite, 317 Ga. App. at
113 (citing to Perrv Golf Course Dev., LLC v. Housing Auth. of the City of Atlanta, 294 Ga.
App. 387, 390, 670 S.E.2d 171 (2008)). Those who have a direct economic interest in or would
benefit from a contract with which they are alleged to have interfered are not strangers to the
contract and cannot have tortiously interfered with that contract. Mabra v. SF, Inc., 316 Ga.
App. 62, 65, 728 S.E.2d 737 (2012).
Here, the Fourth Amended Complaint does not contain allegations that Defendant
Delgado had a direct economic interest in or would benefit from the acquisition transaction.
Defendant Delgado, on behalf of his client NeoMed, was involved in the planning and execution
of the NM Acquisition transaction.

Namely, in August 2016, Defendant Delgado "provided

8

NeoMed with potential restructuring options,':" attended the October 3, 2016 telephone
conference between the defendants regarding the acquisition transaction,

15

attended the October

19, 2016 shareholders' meetings" and on December 28, 2016, "over the minority shareholders'
objections,"17 he "executed and filed a series of documents finalizing the acquisition."!"
Therefore, Defendant Delgado was not a stranger to the acquisition transaction. The Baker
Donelson Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED as to the aiding and
abetting claim.
CONCLUSION
Given all of the above, the Court hereby: DENIES IN PART AND GRANTS IN PART
the Baker Donelson Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as set forth above.

SO ORDERED this LO

L

day of March, 2019.

ELIZABE HE. LONG, SENI
Superior Court of Fulton County
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

14

Fourth Amended Complaint, ~43; see also Fourth Amended Complaint, Exhibit A, 8/24/2016 email from
Delgado to Sherman.
15
Fourth Amended Complaint, ~ 151.
16
Fourtb Amended Complaint, ~ I 16.
17
Fourth Amended Complaint, ~128.
18
Fourth Amended Complaint, ~73.
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